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The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ, 2014) defines Disruptive Behavior
(DB) as any behavior that shows disrespect for others or any interpersonal interaction that
impedes the delivery of patient care. The objective of this study was to identify work impact
and costs of patient disruptive behaviors (DB) at a VAMC facility. DB events were separated
into cost strata to help healthcare administrators understand the economic impact of disruptive
behavior on costs. This study describes the impact of work unit frequency and severity of
patient disruptive behaviors on lost days due to injury, absences, and employee turnover.
Secondly, the impact of disruptive behavior in productivity and resource cost was estimated
using estimated cost weights for staff hiring costs, staff lost duty days cost, staff coverage and
light duty costs, overtime and compensatory time costs, and loss of clinic time. Archival injury
incident data was used to explore the relation between frequency and severity of incidents on
work unit. An economic modeling approach was executed in Microsoft Excel to aggregate cost
estimates and to display the effect of variations in costing assumptions on global cost of DB.
The results of the model showed that the largest contributor to cost is compensation and the
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second largest is direct medical care expenses. Thus, these should be targeted first for
interventions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background and Need
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ, 2014) defines
Disruptive Behavior (DB) as any behavior that shows disrespect for others or any
interpersonal interaction that impedes the delivery of patient care. It is well accepted that
DB is widespread and problematic for health care (Department of Justice, 2011; JC,
2010, 2008; Chen et al, 2009), however, the exact nature and severity of this impact is
mostly unknown and the indirect costs for facilities unexplored. Much of the prevalent
disruptive behavior research has centered on process improvements to prevent staff-tostaff, doctor-to-nurse, and patient safety incidents, however, very little research has
explored the correlation between disruptive behavior incident frequency and severity on
direct and indirect health care costs (Potera, 2016; Phillips, 2016; Rawson, 2013; Jackson
et al, 2002). Without fully understanding the impact of these behaviors on a healthcare
system, fiduciary management of DB prevention programs remains challenging and unestimated. Thus, decisions regarding Full Time Equivalents (FTE) or staff required to
support DB programs are made arbitrarily without any statistical basis or relevance to
how it is impacting access to care.
Many of the current studies seek to simply quantify the frequency of the problem
using retrospective accounts of prior disruptive events. Phillips (2016) surmised that
“One review showed that no two studies have used the same instrument to measure
violence in the emergency department, and nearly every study method was based on
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voluntary retrospective surveys, an approach that risks both selection bias and recall bias”
(p. 1662). Nolan (2000) asserts that there is some disagreement about the amount of
violence that mental health nurses are exposed to, mainly due to non-reporting. This
failure to report, that was highlighted by Davis et al (2015), allows the perpetrator to
victimize others and prevent the facility’s administrative and safety and quality
management teams from recognizing and addressing the presence and severity of staff
members’ routine exposure to violence, ultimately resulting in less nursing staff to care
for patients (while still being fully compensated). Non-reporting is believed to be
rampant within healthcare, due to the common belief that workplace violence (WPV) is
part of the job in nursing (Davis et al., 2015) and that nurses accept it as a routine
occupational hazard. In addition, several articles provided well-meaning multiple step
processes and strategies for addressing workplace violence (Chism, 2012; Nolan, 2000;
Hlebovy, 2000; Davis et al, 2015; Lamberth, 2015b). However, there is limited data in
the literature that confirms any long-lasting success of any of the aforementioned efforts
or interventions on the workplace climate, which has been sustained.

A 2008 Joint Commission sentinel alert discussed that, "There is a history of
tolerance and indifference to intimidating and disruptive behaviors in health care" (Issue
40, 2008, para 5). This attitude is so widespread that, in some settings, disruptive
behavior is considered the norm (AHRQ, 2014). In recent data quoted by the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a division of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2014) which indicated that hospital workers are at
a high risk for experiencing violence in the workplace. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) further indicated that many of the assaults involving days away from work
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occurred at healthcare and social assistance facilities (ranging from 13 to 36 per 10,000
workers) (OSHA, 2016). This rate is much higher than the rate of nonfatal assaults for
all private-sector industries, which is 2 per 10,000 workers (CDC, 2014). In 2013, the
Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) concluded that hospitals are
ranked among the most hazardous places to work (OSHA, 2013). Hlebovy (2000) further
stated that statistics from the Bureau of Labor showed that health care providers are 16
times more likely to experience workplace violence (WPV) than other workers, all under
the auspice that disruptive behavior is believed to be underreported.

Problem Statement
Limited research has examined costs associated with patient disruptive behaviors.
This lack of quantification undermines our ability as healthcare administrators to
understand the value of managing disruptive behaviors, which may have major impacts
on access to care and even employee retention. One study of for-profit, not-for-profit,
and government organizations found that because of “uncivil” behaviors in the
workplace, 53 percent of employees lost time from work, 22 percent deliberately
decreased their work efforts, and 46 percent contemplated changing jobs (Anderson et al.,
2000). Research examining the impact of disruptive behaviors on access or distal factors
related to access (employee absences and turnover) is lacking and not focused on the VA
setting. Further, limited research has even examined costs associated with patient
disruptive behaviors. This lack of quantification undermines our ability to make fiscally
sound decisions in relationship to disruptive behavior prevention programming, which
may have major impacts on access to care and even employee retention.
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Study Setting
Veteran Health Administration (VHA) is the largest healthcare industry in the
world, offering systematic, standardized, and comprehensive databases. A federal
regulation, 38 U.S.C. 501, issued on Dec. 16, 2010, prohibits a prior practice of banning
veterans from care if they threatened or assaulted staff, thus further complicating and
increasing the likelihood of injuries and underreporting. VHA data is unique in that in
addition to be the largest healthcare industry in the world, it has mandated a standardized
real-time data reporting system for disruptive incidents and accident injuries, ensuring
that data from these sources is more likely to be accurate and complete. Recent reports
from Veterans Health Administration Central Office (VHACO, 2016) report that incident
reporting is dramatically improving with the standardization of reporting mechanisms and
that the studied VA facility has reached actualization of this system.
The study VA facility is consistently identified as a leader in many of these areas,
including assessment and measurement of disruptive behaviors (VHACO report, 2016),
making it ideally suited for this study and will include all available de-identified data
from the prior fiscal years (Oct 2014-Sep 2017).
The study VA site is a 5-Star tertiary care teaching hospital providing patient care
and services to more than 75,000 Veterans. This level 1A facility is currently the second
fastest growing VAMC in the U.S. for percent unique patients increase with a growth rate
of 8.52%, providing the full range of inpatient and outpatient care including Medical and
Surgical Intensive Care. The facility also has the 7th best efficiency ranking and scored
91.95% in 2018 Quarter 2 in the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set
(HEDIS) - an independent review of standardized measures across 90% of U.S. health

5

plans and facilities in both the public and private sectors (Department of Veterans
Affairs, 2018). The facility is a VHA leader in Cardiothoracic Surgery, Cardiac Care and
Mental Health Care, and provides comprehensive health care with services including
Neurosurgery, Orthopedics, Women’s Health, Cardiology, Oncology, Nephrology, and
Pulmonary. And lastly, is the site of the VA’s first National Tele-Mental Health Hub,
providing evidence-based psychotherapies for PTSD, etc. to Veterans; has an extensive
Homeless Program including such services as Compensated Work Therapy and the
Housing and Urban Development; and is home to one of the VAMC's Research Program
(housing more than 100 investigators involved in 280+ projects funded at $28.8M
annually).
In addition, the study site’s yearly Workplace Behavioral Risk Assessment
(WBRA) data which suggests that instances of employee and patient violence are
significantly increasing in both frequency and severity, with 405 combined reported
incidents during the study period. However, these incidents are believed to be
underreported and have not been correlated to quantifiable impacts on work units.
Study Objective
The objective of this study was to identify the type of disruptive behavior that is
recorded for the VA and to estimate the cost of patient disruptive behaviors using and
economic estimation model.
This model helped identify the major cost drivers for patient disruptive behavior
at the study facility and allows us to understand and target the top disruptive behaviors
for prevention and other interventions.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Even though Disruptive Behavior is prevalent in all healthcare facilities and
despite the commonality of its influence and frequency, its impact is broad and seemingly
unmanageable. Limited research has examined costs associated with patient disruptive
behaviors. This lack of quantification undermines the ability of healthcare administrators
to understand the value of managing disruptive behaviors, which may have major impacts
on access to care and even employee retention.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has classified
workplace violence into 4 major types: Type 1) Criminal intent – Where perpetrator has
no legitimate relationship to business or employer; 2) Customer/Client – Which is the
most frequent in healthcare setting (patient on worker violence; 3) Worker/Workerwhich can be lateral or horizontal from doctor to nurse or nurse to nurse, respectively;
and 4) Personal Relationships, where the perpetrator has a personal relationship to worker
outside of work, that spills into the work environment (CDC, 2016).
Although workplace violence can occur in any area of a healthcare facility, the
most volatile areas are Emergency Departments (ED) and psychiatric unit (Lecky, 2011;
Nolan, 2000; Reade, 2012) and WPV occurs on a frequent basis in nursing (Kvas et al,
2014; Gerberich et al., 2005; Davis et al, 2015). Nolan (2000) discussed that ambulance,
ED and mental health services also were groups at the greatest risk for violence.
Regarding offenders, patients are consistently identified as the most common perpetrators
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of violence, usually categorized as Type II violence (‘‘Customer/Client’’), although coworker on co-worker assaults are also common (Hodgson et al, 2012).
Chen, Hwu, & Wang (2009) reported that WPV in health care has become a
global problem, despite that many health care leaders deny that horizontal/lateral or
vertical WPV is occurring at all and thus fail to take ownership (Littlejohn, 2012). The
Emergency Nurses Association’s (2011) Emergency Department Violence Surveillance
Study revealed that almost 70% of all respondents had been physically threatened, 52%
had been physically assaulted, and 40% had been involved in a violent situation at their
job in which a weapon was utilized. Of those routinely exposed to physical violence,
about 17% experienced the behavior more than four times a week.
This literature review examined patient disruptive behavior and costs related to
these injuries, through the lenses of WPV, as most of the literature was searchable and
identifiable through WPV. The review examined past and current literature in an attempt
to determine gaps in studies, correlations or additional opportunities for further research.
The current literature researched included a systemic review of many articles with
PubMed and online. The inclusion criteria within the search were articles relevant to the
topic, peer reviewed, and written in the English language. To help clarify if there were
longstanding or recent issues available, no limits were placed on the year of publication.
The following key terms were utilized: ‘workplace violence’, ‘disruptive behavior in
healthcare’, ‘workplace bullying in healthcare’ and ‘violence in the workplace’.
The initial literature review utilized ‘workplace violence’ within the PubMed
search engine, resulting in 1745 articles and several online articles. These results were
then refined by adding the limitation of ‘healthcare’, which diminished the number of
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discoverable articles to 536. Past and recent articles were available on workplace
bullying, workplace violence, as well as quality improvement articles to address these
concerns. Articles were rejected if repetitious in nature to previous articles already
reviewed, or not directly relevant to the disruptive behavior in healthcare topic, or didn’t
add any substantive contribution to information already disclosed. This resulted in a total
of 28 articles referenced and included in this review.
Need to Report Incidents
An association study indicated that between 8% and 13% of ED nurses reported
that they were victims of violence at work every week. Davis et al. (2015) asserted that
nurses failed to report physical violence in 66% of these cases because they believed that
violence was just “part of the job.” This failure to report, that was highlighted by Davis
et al. (2015), allows the perpetrator to victimize others and prevent the facility’s
administrative and safety and quality management teams from recognizing and
addressing the presence and severity of staff members’ routine exposure to violence,
ultimately resulting in less nursing staff to care for patients (while still being fully
compensated). Non-reporting is believed to be rampant within healthcare, due to the
common belief that WPV is part of the job in nursing (Davis et al., 2015) and that nurses
accept it as a routine occupational hazard.
The negative consequences of WPV behavior on the mental health and wellbeing
of employees are a growing focus in the literature, as it directly impacts organizational
performance (Ariza-Montes et al, 2013). Fink-Samnick (2015) discussed that the
emerging regulatory and organizational initiatives to reframe the delivery of care will
become meaningless if the continued level of violence among and against the health care
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workforce continues. The quality and safe patient-centered care will never be achieved in
the absence of an atmosphere where neither the patients nor workforce are safe (FinkSamnick, 2015) and the lack of reporting continues. Staff must understand the
importance of reporting incidents and not feel that incidents are “part of the job”.
In a survey conducted by Pompeii et al (2016), the author discusses and
contradicts much of the recent literature regarding lack of underreporting by healthcare
workers. Pompeii et al. concluded from their survey that 75% of their respondents had
reported their type II events however, their study did further identify that various
mechanisms for documenting the reports were used, thus they are recorded in some form,
but not easily retrievable. In addition, these untraditional mechanisms for reporting
circumvent the normal occupational injury surveillance tools (i.e. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) Logs, Worker’s Compensation); further complicating
the ability of researchers to extract lost injury data and costs associated to the DB events.
Lack of Costs
Historically, there is very little evidence about patient disruptive behavior and its
impact on access to care and retention. Articles related to disruptive behavior and
impacts on costs were minimal and only identified in three articles reviewed (Potera,
2016; Phillips, 2016; Jackson, 2002). The prevalent disruptive behavior studies are
centered on incidents regarding staff to staff, doctor to nurse, patient safety concerns, and
process improvements. Many of these studies seek to simply quantify the problem and
are retrospective studies, which require staff to recall their incidents. In addition, several
articles provided well-meaning multiple-step processes and strategies for addressing
WPV (Chism, 2012; Nolan, 2000; Hlebovy, 2000; Davis et al., 2015; Lamberth, 2015b).
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Thus, there is no data in the literature that confirms any long-lasting success of any of the
aforementioned efforts or interventions
Further research must be conducted to bridge the gap on defining the true number
of staff impacted, how to reduce the number of staff affected, and how to get staff to feel
safe reporting WPV or DB. Current DB studies do not provide a measure of costs for
disruptive events, therefore, there is no well-defined determination on how many
resources are needed to estimate what is needed (FTE, mental support for staff, DB
committee and support staff). This study begins to only quantify the impact of disruptive
behavior and focus the light on how DB affects access to care, therefore, the resources
truly required to manage DB will not be addressed in this study. The overall existing
literature regarding workplace violence in healthcare is increasing, however escalating
employee violence incidences in frequency and severity (The Joint Commission, 2010 &
2008) leaves uncertainty to the fact that anyone truly understands its impact or has
sustained any longstanding success in limiting its impact on staff, fiscal management, and
access to care. Further studies are required to use the costs determination in determining
the resources needed to manage DB.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
The objective of this study is to identify the type of disruptive behavior that is
recorded for the VA and to estimate the cost of patient disruptive behaviors using an
economic estimation model. We will:
1. Analyze the VAMC data on disruptive patient behavior to estimate the mean
annual number of events and the cost per event by type of cost
2. Aggregate the events and costs into an economic model programmed in
Microsoft Excel to estimate the two largest cost drivers for disruptive patient
behavior.
This model will help VA administrators and others to identify the major cost
drivers for patient disruptive behavior at VHA facilities and allow us to better understand
and target the top disruptive behaviors for prevention and other interventions.
Population
This study used de-identified secondary data from the study facility’s DBRS and
ASISTS data system. This DBRS is a secured, web-based system developed by the VHA
(2015) and installed in every facility, which allows all employees to have a voice
regarding any concerns they may have about safety. The DBRS provides information
back to employees that their reports have been received and that action is being taken to
address their concerns. Information originally contained Social Security information,
names, and other PHI information. The DBRS data was de-identified and only incidents
that were initiated by patients and involved employees were extracted for this study.
Patient incidents were linked to the ASISTS data and used to estimate the cost for the
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event. The DBRS data set is strictly the study facility’s data and rendered 1,376
incidents.
The ASISTS software package (VHA, 2011) stores data on accidents causing
injuries and illnesses reported via the Report of Incident. The employee may choose to
apply for compensation using the Federal Employee's Notice of Traumatic Injury and
Claim for Continuation of Pay/Compensation (CA-1) when the incident is an injury and
the Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation (CA-2) for an illness
(ASISTS, 2012, p. 1). The ASISTS data set also contained demographic information,
occupation, lost duty days, and costs specifically related to a disruptive behavior event.
Upon retrieval of the ASISTS data, records were initially segregated to retain only those
records that were the result of disruptive behavior. ASISTS data inputs are completed by
various entities (injured employee, supervisor of employee and Safety specialist).
Worker Compensation specialist can input data for employees, when they are available,
due to injury. Of special note, ASISTS data should be inputted within 5 days, but doesn’t
always occur due to unavailability of the various entities and is a concern in regard to
recall and recollection. There were a total of 988 injury and illness incidents reviewed
for fiscal years 2014 - 2017, resulting in 94 disruptive incidents that were relevant for this
study. Based on ASISTS data and name of staff injured, specific salary information was
obtained from Feds Center Data (2018) to determine the actual expenses in Table 4,
within the results section. DOL (2018) was used to estimate cost impact to our study
facility.
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Data Description
Archival data from the Veterans Health Administration Central Office (VHACO)
mandated tracking systems was used. This data included trends of disruptive patient and
employee incidents. This data is in compliance with the OSHA General Duty Clause,
including incident date, type, persons involved, nature of event, injury, contributing
medical or systems contributions and risk assessment for future violence. Other data
sources may also contribute to the model. VHACO requires facilities to collect and trend
data on employee training in violence prevention as well as their competency in
mandated training goals. VHACO also requires facilities to track and trend factors
contributing to Employee Workforce Development, such as unit call outs, retention,
promotion, or separation. De-identified data from a required retrospective chart review
will form the bases for the estimates. The study was approved by the Institutional
Review Board for the Medical University of South Carolina and for the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
This study used incident details to aggregate work unit location (frequency,
severity) and occupational code of affected employees, as measured by Workplace
Behavioral Risk Assessment (WBRA) data, which includes Uniformed Officer Reports,
Disruptive Behavior Reporting System incidents, and Automated Safety Incident
Surveillance and Tracking System (ASISTS). Lost duty days and direct injury costs were
obtained via ASISTS incident summary reports. Staff turnover and absences was
obtained by Human Resource (HR) data. Access to care was measured by clinic access
reports (clinic cancellations, average wait time). Descriptive statistics (means, medians,
ranges, standard deviations, frequencies and percentages) were estimated using Microsoft
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Excel for each of these variables. Cost per event was estimated using relevant national
cost weights for the resources used.
Data Analysis
Datasets were initially de-identified and segregated based on disruptive
behavioral events and analysis of occupational codes, locations, and costs estimates
(compensation and medical costs). The events, which did not involve DB events were
removed from the study and were then able to begin to answer the study questions. The
outcomes of the analysis are comparisons by location code and of the total cost of
disruptive events. Descriptive statistics were conducted of the variables using means and
standard deviations.
Two data sets were utilized in this analysis: 1) Reported disruptive behavior
reporting system (DBRS) data set from FY 2014 through FY 2017 collected from
uniformed officer, clinician or HR reports as one line per event; 2) A separate data set
with injury or illness (ASISTS) resulting from a disruptive event that is linkable with the
disruptive event report. The variables, locations, and occupational codes (with hourly
salary) are available in the DBRS data sets provided in Table 1-3 below.
TABLE 1 – VARIABLES (VHA, 2015)
Variable Name
Location
Shift

Variable measure
See Table 2
1=Day; 2 =Swing;
3=Night

Tour

1=Standard Work Week;
2=Weekend;
3=Holiday

Interpretation
Days=0800-1600 (8:00 am to
4:00 pm)
Swings=1600-2400
(4:00 pm to Midnight)
Nights= 0000-0800
(Midnight to 8:00 am)
Monday through Friday
Saturday or Sunday
Any Federal holiday
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Person Engage in
Behavior:
Person Experiencing
Behavior
Occupational Code
Sexual Assault
Behavior Related to
Alcohol or Substance
Abuse
Physical Containment
Required
Who Was Affected

Severity of Outcome

1=patient; 2=employee;
3=visitor; 4=multiple;
5=Other
1=patient; 2=employee;
3=visitor; 4=multiple;
5=Other
See Table 3
0=No; 1=Yes
0=No; 1=Yes

Other could be a contractor

Other could be a contractor

0=No; 1=Yes
0 =No one; 1=Person(s)
engaging in the behavior
during the incident;
2=Person(s)
experiencing or targeted
by the behavior; 3 =Both
0=None; 1=Negligible; 2
=Marginal;3=Critical;
4=Catastrophic

Both=the person(s) engaging
in the behavior and
experiencing the behavior

0= No identifiable negative
outcomes from the incident
1= No physical injury,
minimal emotional trauma,
minimal lost work time (i.e.
less than 1 day), time-limited
or minor negative impact in
the workplace
2= Minor physical injury (i.e.
bruises, cuts, sprains), mild
to moderate emotional
trauma, some lost work time,
or negative impact on the
workplace lasting more than
one day but less than one
month
3=Severe physical injury
(loss of limbs or use of
limbs, hospitalization),
significant emotional trauma,
extended period of time lost
from work, or sustained
negative im pact on the
workplace lasting more than
one month
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4= Fatality, coma, severe
and/or persistent emotional
trauma, cannot return to
work, severe negative
impact on the workplace or
working conditions
TABLE 2 – LOCATIONS (VHA, 2015)
1
2
3
4
5

6

7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20

Emergency Room, Emergency Department, Urgent Care Center
Inpatient/Acute Psychiatry
Inpatient Medicine/Surgical
Intensive Care Unit, Post-Operative Care, Surgery
Inpatient Other (please specify type of workplace rather than
facility-specific identifier (e.g., please do not use “7C” or “Bldg
107”)
Outpatient Mental Health /Behavioral Health Clinic not at a CBOC
(including outpatient Mental Health Specialty clinics—e.g.,
Substance Abuse Treatment Program, PTSD Clinical Team, etc.)
Outpatient Primary Care not at a CBOC
Outpatient Clinic not at a CBOC, Other (in the "Other
Information" column, please specify type of w orkplace rather
than facility-specific identifier (e.g., use "Dental Clinic" instead of
“7C-South”)
Radiology, Dialysis, Catheterization Lab, Physical/Occupational
Rehabilitation or other study/intervention areas
Pharmacy
Travel Office
Administrative (e.g., Executive Office, Business Office,
Enrollment, etc.)
Human Resources
Parking, Smoking Areas, Facility grounds outside of buildings
Community Living Center
Residential Treatment Program
Domiciliary
Community-Based Outpatient Clinic (CBOC)
Community-Based Program, Workplace off-site (including Mental
Health Intensive Case Management, E nhanced R A N G E ,
Veterans Justice Outreach, Homeless programs, Home Based
Primary Care, etc.)
Non-clinical and Non-administrative workplaces within the facility
(including Voluntary Services, C anteen , Cafeteria,
Environmental Management Service, Laundry, Engineering,
Government Vehicle Fleet,Shuttle Service,etc.)

17
21

22

Common areas within the facility shared by all (including main
lobbies, entries, hallways, elevators, public restroom s not
affiliated with one discreet clinical area such as a CBOC, Dental
Clinic, etc.)
Other Workplace/Location (please specify type of workplace rather
than facility-specific identifier (e.g., please do not use “7C” or
“Bldg 107”)

TABLE 3 – OCCUPATIONAL CODES and estimated hourly salary including
assumed value of fringe benefits (VHA, 2015)
Occupation Code
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
35
36
37
38

Hourly Salary
Estimate (DOL, 2018)

Physician - Primary Care
Physician - Surgeon including all sub-specialties
Physician - Psychiatrist
Physician - Anesthesiologist
Physician - Medicine including all sub-specialties
Physician - All other physicians
Dentist
Podiatrist
Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA)
Optometrist
Physician Assistant
Nurse Practitioner
RN - Level I
RN - Level II
RN - Level III
RN - Level V
LPN
Nursing Assistant
Pharmacist
Pharmacy Technician
Psychologist
Social Worker
Chaplain
Physical Medicine Therapist (for example a PT, OT or KT)
Respiratory Therapist (for example a RRT or CRTT)
Other certified or licensed hands-on direct patient care
provider (for example a Dietitian)
Other non-licensed hands-on direct patient care provider
Clinical laboratory employee excluding administrative
support employees (for example Medical Technologists
and Technicians)

97.66
106.09
95.87
97.48
100.54
85.47
76.02
61.41
127.88
53.03
50.41
53.77
28.66
45.32
48.79
78.68
21.98
13.72
59.15
15.90
95.87
29.53
25.36
42.62
29.76
32.62
38.92
26.58
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39

40

41
42
45
46
48
50
51
52
53

54
55
60
61
62
63
64
70
71
72
73
74
119

Other

Diagnostic Imaging Technician excluding administrative
support employee (for example Diagnostic X- Ray or
Nuclear Medicine)
Administrative or clerical employee working in a clinical
area (for example a Ward Secretary, Radiology
Receptionist)
Chiropractor
Clinical Nurse Specialist
Police Officer
Contract Specialists GS-1102
Clinical Informatics
Other administrative, technical, professional or clerical
employee at GS-1 through GS–8
Administrative, technical or professional employee at GS-9
through GS-12
Administrative, technical or professional employee GS-13
or GS-14
Administrative employee at or above the GS-15 and Title
38 equivalent level including members of facility, VISN,
and CO program office senior leadership teams
Chief Officer
Decision Support System (DSS)
Housekeeping employees at WG-1 through WG-3
Other WG employees at WG-1 through WG-4
WG Employee at WG-5 through WG-8
WG Employee at WG-9 or above
Work Leader (WL) or Work Supervisor (WS)
Canteen employee
Homeless Program Employee
Non-Clinical Scientist
Intermediate Care Technician
Human Resources Specialist
Educator/Learning Officer (for example Nursing Educator,
Designated Learning Officer, Designated Education
Officer)
Described occupation of "Other" in column R on the Raw
Data Sheet

30.97

57.05

32.81
33.65
29.41
33.66
42.92
18.74
59.35
82.79
112.35

112.35
18.45
13.97
15.61
26.01
38.92
22.43
29.76
32.62
38.92
26.58
30.97
57.05

N/A

Costing and Model Estimation
Costs captured included estimates of time used in the incident, time used for
reporting and recording of the incident, potential lost work days, light duty days,
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estimated medical treatments, estimated sick days (call outs) and potential effect on the
turnover of staff. Salary data (Feds Center Data, 2018) for the individuals were used to
estimate economic cost. Estimates not available in the data set were extracted from the
Department of Labor (2018), May 2017, national occupational employment and wage
estimates.
An Excel model was used to aggregate the results from the event and costing data
sources, and supplemented this data with estimates from the literature that describes costs
that have not been captured in the VAMC reports. This model has the cost perspective of
the VAMC and is based on the mean annual number of events observed in our data.
These events were costed using the mean costs estimated from the cost data analysis.
Unmeasured costs, such as the time used to resolve the incident and make the formal
written report, were estimated. Other potential costs, such as increase in clinical staff
turnover were included in a sensitivity analysis. The effects of variations of the model
parameters were also examined in a sensitivity analysis that varies the model parameters
between plus and minus 10% of the base model values.
Limitations
The analysis is limited by the accuracy and inclusiveness of the underlying
databases, including collection bias, recollection of events, and events that are not
reported. In addition, there is data, which could not be quantified, such as call-outs or
number of sick days taken by clinicians due to a DB event. Also, data was not available
to clearly quantify staff that chose not to return to work (quit), based on disruptive events,
as this information was not being captured or the employees were not communicating this
upon their departures. It is believed to be a plausible concern, as the VA must go through
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numerous steps to limit the admission of a repeat offender. In most cases, a repeat
offender receives numerous behavioral flags (Weinberger et al, 2018) within their
medical record, is limited to where they can visit during appointments, and after
subsequent visits receives a police escort for future visits. These interventions normally
do not address staff concerns (fears) or limit their exposure to additional events,
especially, when the patient is an inpatient and thus contributing to multiple events
experienced by staff and increased injuries to several clinicians during repeat visits.
There were some considerable challenges in getting workers compensation
numbers during this study, as they support the cost estimate model. This included
medical costs, compensation, and Chargebacks costs from the Department of Labor
(DOL). Future studies should incorporate these expenses to better predict costs related to
DB.
Additionally, the study conclusions are generalizable only to the Veterans Health
Administration (VHA) facilities, and no other civilian facilities. Application to other
facilities might not yield the same results, as civilian facilities are not under the same
political requirements and mandates as the VHA to allow disruptive behavior in their
facilities.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Event Data Analysis
The data reported in the studied facility disruptive behavior reporting system
(DBRS) data set was collected from uniformed officer, clinician or HR reports as one line
per event were analyzed using Excel. A total of 1,376 incidents were reported. These
incidents were distributed among 22 possible work sites as shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Location and Number of Incidents Reported

1,376 Total Incidents

The 402 (29.2%) of recorded incidents occurred at a community-based outpatient
clinic (CBOC). The study facility has six CBOCs and in the past three years there have
not been uniformed officers at all the CBOCs. Recently (in fiscal 2018), a uniformed
officer has been placed at each facility due to the rise in disruptive behavior at the
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CBOCs. This study did not examine the impact of that change but is of important note
when reviewing these results.
In the emergency room/emergency department or sometimes called the Urgent
Care Center (ER/ ED/UCC), there were 191 events (13.9%) reported, making it the
second highest location where disruptive events occurred. This location is at the main
facility and has limited staffing on weekends and at nights to address the complexity of
numerous conditions.
The inpatient Psychiatric Ward 3A had 115 (8.3%) events, and the inpatient
Medical/Surgical Ward had 92 (6.7%) events, making them the top 3rd and 4th location
where disruptive events occurred within the study facility. These locations (including
ED) house many mentally challenged patients with altered mental status associated with
dementia, delirium, substance intoxication, or decompensated mental illness (OSHA
2016). In addition, many of the injury and disruptive behavior reports, identify the same
veteran causing several incidents to various staff within the same date and time.
The 1,090 (79.2%) of the reported incidents were verbal behaviors, 524 were
criminal or unsafe acts, 409 (29.7%) were physically disruptive, 222 (16.1%) involved a
need for physical restraints, and 181 (13.2%) involved alcohol or substance abuse. In
addition, a relatively small number (32 or 2.5%) of events involved sexual assaults
(alleged or confirmed) or patient abuse (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Disruptive Behaviors by Type

The person who engaged in the behavior was most often a patient. A total of
1,170 (85%) events were due to disruptive behavior by a patient. These are the events
that are of greatest interest in this study. The distribution of events by persons engaging
in the behavior is shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Individual Engaging in Behavior

24

However, the person most likely to experience the disruptive behavior by a
patient was primarily an employee (most notably a clinician). Out of 1,376 events, 729
(53%) disruptive events impacted staff. In addition, another 427 events (31%) of the total
incidents within this study involved multiple experiencers (i.e. meaning a patient, staff,
and/or visitor was also involved in the event). In reviewing the incident reports, most of
the multiple incidents included a staff member, for that reason we included the multiple
incidents in the category of “staff events” in the cost model. The distribution of events
by persons experiencing the behavior is shown in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Individual Experiencing the Behavior

The severity of the adverse effect on the individual experiencing the behavior was
rated on a scale between 0 and 4 as described in the Variable List in Table 1. Most
events were rated 0 and only one event had a rating of 4. The distribution of event
severity during the study period are provided in Table 4 below. As evidence by the data,
the events were primarily minor in nature, as 711 events (51.7%) had no negative
outcome and 460 (33.4 %) had no physical injury that was communicated, holding true to
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the expected outcome, that as the incident number decreased, the severity would increase.
There were 204 events (14.8%) that had some physical and/or mental impact that was
communicated, and some costs associated with its impact. These are the costs concerns
that this study evaluated.
However, this data is limited in the aspect, that it only provides information in
which the staff felt comfortable disclosing in reports or sharing in reports to investigators
(safety staff, police officers, or nurse educators). There is a pertinacity of clinicians to
minimize the impact of injuries (Gates, 1999), thus there is a bias within this data that
lends itself to requiring further study.
Table 4: Distribution and types of the 1,376 events observed during the study period
Event Severity

N (%)

Severity
Score

No identifiable negative outcomes from the incident

711 (51.7)

0

No physical injury, minimal emotional trauma, minimal
lost work time (i.e. less than 1 day), time-limited or minor
negative impact in the workplace
Minor physical injury (i.e. bruises, cuts, sprains), mild to
moderate emotional trauma, some lost work time, or
negative impact on the workplace lasting more than one
day but less than one month
Severe physical injury (loss of limbs or use of limbs,
hospitalization), significant emotional trauma, extended
period of time lost from work, or sustained negative impact
on the workplace lasting more than one month
Fatality, coma, severe and/or persistent emotional trauma,
cannot return to work, severe negative impact on the
workplace or working conditions

460 (33.4)

1

168 (12.2)

2

36 (2.6)

3

1 (0.1)

4

Results of the Occupational Codes yielded unexpected results (See Figure 5). The
occupational codes were initially grouped and then ranked by the most frequent code, to
determine the top 5 occupations most affected by DB. Of 1,373 incidents, most incidents
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involved a nurse with 312 events. The frontline staff (or commonly called the
administration staff) was involved in 218 events. Police officers were the 3rd group, with
142 events, Physicians had 130 events and social workers had 46 events. To determine
staff probability of exposure to a DB event, the following base number of staff were
received: 1) Nurses: 618 staff; 2) Admin staff: 279; 3) Police Officers: 20; Physicians:
293; and 4) Social Workers: 116. Police officers were 6 times more likely to be involved
in an event than the other occupational codes.
Figure 5: Results of Occupational Codes

Cost Data Analysis
The data base which contained the cost of assaults or other events recorded in the
study had severe limitations. To overcome problems of missing cost data, we examined
the available complete cases and used those to estimate mean cost and the variations in
these cost estimates. The result of this estimate is provided in Table 5 below.
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Table 5: Case Cost, Mean Cost and SD for complete cost records for assault
Case
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mean (SD)

Medical Cost
$43.74.38
$18,050.61
$476.89
$22,997.83
$6,844.84
$29,031.27
$886.06
$5,358.93
$49.54
$9,786 (30,519)

Compensation Cost
$209.97
$26,600.26
$7,768.71
$6,155.90
$1,387.18
$53,250.98
$10,382.03
$11,750 (50,086)

Total Cost
$4584.35
$18,050.61
$476.89
$49,598.09
$14,613.55
$35,187.17
$2,273.24
$58,609.91
$10,431.57
$21,536 (60,279)

The mean medical care cost for an assault was $9,785 with a very large range as
indicated by the SD of $30,519. Compensation costs associated with an assault had a
mean of $11,750 (SD 50,086). Thus, the combined recorded cost of an assault was
$21,536 (SD 60,279). While the number of records is limited in number, they provide a
good indication of the magnitude of the direct cost that is associated with an assault that
results in bodily harm (most likely a score of 3 on the severity rating) with a need to
receive medical care.
The Costs Process Flow Chart in Figure 5, developed by Dr. Kirstin Gros,
Clinical Psychologist from the Department of Veterans Affairs, demonstrates an
algorithm of how costs are incurred from a disruptive behavior event. This graphical
depiction includes direct (real dollar costs) and indirect costs (time, opportunities, and
other miscellaneous costs – legal, employee turnover, callouts, etc.).
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Figure 6: The Costs Process Flow Chart (Gros, 2017)

Definitions:
AES = All Employee Survey
CPRS = Computerized Patient Record System
CA1 = Claim for Continuation of Pay/Compensation (CA-1)
WBRA = Workplace Behavioral Risk Assessment
OT = Overtime
HR = Human Resources
EAP = Employee Assistance Program
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Model Estimates
In an attempt to estimate the costs identified in Figure 5, the estimate model in the
Appendix calculated the expected impact of DB to the study facility per year. These cost
estimates are depicted in Figure 6 and demonstrates that there is an expected costs of over
half a million dollars in direct and indirect costs annually. These costs are underestimates
as costs were estimated using average salary data and costs do not include costs related to
staff that must be replaced or the need to divert patients due to low staffing numbers on
work units (wards). The study facility’s revenue losses (due to light duty days, lost duty
days, and reassignments) actually are not rare, as the data revealed that 3% (41) events
occurred during study period which involved multiple staff. The impact of one patient,
injuring 2-3 workers on a work unit is costly and a common occurrence. More research
needs to be conducted to further understand this impact on the access to care problem, as
there is a correlation that needs to be addressed.
Figure 7: Cost Estimation Model for VAMC Patient Disruptive Behavior
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The cost estimate model does show that the legal expenses (35.8%) are the
greatest annual cost, due to the one traumatic injury/death that occurred within the 4-year
study period. This includes a $500,000 death benefit assumption. Since the likelihood of
a traumatic event occurring is every 3-4 years, it is safe to focus our efforts (for study
purposes) on the next costs that create greater than a quarter of a million of expenses each
year (compensation and medical care costs).
Compensation costs account for over 168K (31.3%) of the annual expenses
related to DB and is the primary cost generator of disruptive events. Mitigation efforts
and additional studies must be undertaken to reduce these costs. The actual medical
expenses were approximately 102K (18.9%) and the second major expense generated
from disruptive events by patients (Customer/Client), not even addressing all the other
disruptive events caused by Criminal intent, Worker/Worker, and Personal Relationships.
Thus, the model (Figure 6) showed that the largest contributor to cost is compensation
and the second largest is direct medical care expenses, excluding legal expenses. Thus,
compensation and medical care expenses should be targeted first for interventions.
We performed a sensitivity analysis of the cost estimates where we doubled the
number of hours assumed to be involved in each event, because we used the lowest time
estimate in the base model estimation. This sensitivity analysis increased the total cost
estimate from $537,797 to $652,041 per year, with compensation increasing from
$168,143 in the base estimate to $207,376 when the time estimates were increased. We
also performed a sensitivity analysis to examine the effect of assuming that fringe
benefits were not included in our salary estimates. When we added an organizational
mean fringe benefit rate of 27% to the sensitivity analysis model the total annual cost
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increased to $748,539 and the compensation cost estimate increased from $168, 143 in
the base model to $203,368 with higher time estimate and inclusion of 27% fringe benefit
rates. Thus, the model is very sensitive to the time values used for the process estimates,
and salary cost weights should include all fringe benefits.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This research addressed the impact of disruptive behavior at a VHA facility and
the limited body of knowledge on the costs associated to this behavior, while addressing
the correlation of the disruptive behavior of the Veterans (patients) and their impact on
the staff that provides location, severity, and direct and indirect costs associated with
these events. These findings attempt to provide healthcare administrators an additional
resource on the true costs of disruptive behavior and heighten the interest for further
study of the impact of disruptive behavior, as there was limited data to reference
regarding this study.
Summary of Findings
Finding 1: Study helped to assess the impact of disruptive behavior by patients on
a VA facility. Patient-to-staff incidents are a major concern at the VA study facility and
administrators need to minimize patient impact to staff. These DB incidents accounted
for a total of 1,170 (85%) events within the study period. There is a belief that these
incidents are underreported or if reported, the data is not codified well. Additionally,
clinicians are the primary experiencer of DB incidents by patients and therefore should be
provided tools to manage this behavior.
Finding two: Results guided targeted costs interventions. There are significant
costs related to disruptive behaviors – direct and indirect-- that correlate to impacts on
access to care (Table 5 and Figure 6). Our study VA facility had expenses greater than
half million, not including staff costs required to replace injured employees or diverting
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of patients. The sensitivity model increased our understanding of the relationships to the
time values used for the process estimates and salary cost weights, if we include all fringe
benefits. Compensation and medical care expenses should be targeted first for
interventions. The cost estimate worksheet and sensitivity models are in Appendix and
displays a cost estimate, which correlates with costs generated in Figure 5, the Cost
Process Flow Chart. Cost Estimation Model is Most Generalizable aspect of this study.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This research hopes to contribute to the body of knowledge regarding disruptive
behaviors in a VHA hospital setting. Results indicate that patients are the primary
individuals engaged in DB events. Results also indicate that clinicians (Nurses, Police,
Physicians, and Med/Heath Technicians) are the primary individuals experiencing DB
events, however Police Officers are exposed more frequently during the response of a DB
event.
While we will never truly know the entire impact, it is incumbent on
administrators to seek to quantify this impact. If you have clinicians that are being
harmed, then they are also not performing patient care. The fiscal impact of their loss
duty days, light duty, and call outs has not been captured in its totality and needs further
research on a larger and more extensive scale. When clinicians are on light-duty or
unable to work, healthcare administrators are either managing with less staff (affecting
morale) and/or hiring additional staff to fill vacancies; either way, the impact to a
hospital’s revenue is impactful, while not even addressing the legal monetary impact to
these types of events as well.
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Another by-product to or complication from clinicians being injured and not
working to their full capacity is an access to care issue. Currently, the Department of
Veteran Affairs has an access issue as penned by Dr. Robert Pearl (a Stanford University
professor) in a Forbes article in May 2018, after he had an opportunity to work at the
Veterans Administration Hospital in Palto Alto, CA. He discussed: “In fact, lengthy wait
times for treatment have become the norm inside many of the nation’s 1,243 VA
facilities, particularly, those located in rural areas. Such delays were the root of a scandal
that erupted in 2014, following reports of patient negligence and falsified data on the
timeliness of access to care” (Pearl, 2018).
Even though this study did not quantify the number of clinicians currently not in
their jobs due to disruptive behavior, I would surmise that if 10 clinicians are not working
in their primary job due to DB, it has a substantial cost and an impact to access to care.
Further study must be done to better understand this impact.
Also, while prevention of DB was not addressed in this study, targeted training is
recommended to educate staff on signs of aggravated patients, deescalating skills, and
skillset to protect themselves during a DB event. Police officers needs specialized
training in de-escalation and skills to protect themselves during an event.
Areas for further study
This study was limited in scope to one VA facility and does not address the
impact to over 1,242 other facilities, in addition to patient’s homes and/or vet centers. It
is my hope that this study will spark the interest of a study on a larger scale that seeks not
only to quantify the costs associated with disruptive behaviors but provides some
remedies to diminish these events.
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To date, behavior flags are a primary tool used at VA facilities to combat and
attempt to correct patient behavior. Further study is needed to determine whether the
placement of these behavior flags in medical records are healthful or generate additional
frustrations to Veterans (creating hostile environments) – are they contributory to the
patient-employee incidents.
Additionally, this study was consistent with established literature by clearly
identifying a culture of acceptance in the healthcare industry, in regard to DB incidents.
While this study does not address mitigation of these incidents, there has to be efforts and
studies geared to the reduction of the mental, physical and fiscal impact to the entire
healthcare industry, by allowing staff to believe DB events are “part of the job”. The
healthcare industry has a responsibility to provide a safe and healthful workplace; DB
events are no exception to the rule.

36

REFERENCES
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). (2014). Disruptive and
unprofessional behavior. Retrieved April 3, 2016, from
https://psnet.ahrq.gov/primers/primer/15/disruptive-and-unprofessional-behavior
Anderson L., Pearson C, Porath C. (2000). Assessing and attacking workplace incivility.
Organizational Dynamics 2000; 29(2).
Ariza-Montes A., Muniz N., Montero-Simo M., Araque-Padilla R. (2013). Workplace
bullying among healthcare workers. International Journal of Environmental
Research and Public Health, 10, 3121–3139.
Automated Safety Incident Surveillance Tracking System (ASISTS) (2012). Automated
safety incident surveillance tracking system (asists) v. 2.0. Retrieved on July 28,
2018 from:
https://www.va.gov/vdl/documents/Financial_Admin/ASISTS/oops2_15_rn.doc
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2016). Workplace violence
prevention for nurses: workplace violence types. National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, Division of Safety Research. Retrieved from:
https://wwwn.cdc.gov/wpvhc/Course.aspx/Slide/Unit1_5
Chen, W., Hwu, H., & Wang, J. (2009). Hospital staff responses to workplace violence in
a psychiatric hospital in Taiwan. International Journal of Occupational and
Environmental Health, 15, 173–179.
Chism, M. (2012). Mastering energy to avoid drama in your healthcare practice. Journal
of Medical Practice Management. 2012 Sep-Oct ;28(2):106-8.
Davis, C. BSN, RN, CCRN; Landon, D. BSN, RN, CMSC; Brothers, K. MSN, RN, CNL
(2015). Safety alert: protecting yourself and others from violence. Nursing, 55-59,
January 2015.
Department of Labor (DOL)(2018). May 2017 national occupational employment and
wage estimates, united states. Retrieved July 22, 2018:
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm.
Department of Justice, US Office of Justice Programs (March 2011). Bureau of Justice
Statistics report, Workplace Violence, 1993-2009 National Crime Victimization
Survey and the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. Retrieved from:
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/wv09.pdf.
Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration (VHA) 2018. Strategic
analytics for improvement and learning (sail). Retrieved from:
https://www.va.gov/QUALITYOFCARE/measureup/Strategic_Analytics_for_Improvement_and_Learning_SAIL.asp

37

Department of Veteran Affairs, Veterans Health Administration (VHA) (December,
2015). Disruptive behavior reporting system (dbrs). Disruptive Behavior
Reporting System, version 2.17. Retrieved April 5, 2016.
Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration (VHA) (2011).
Automated safety incident surveillance and tracking system (asists). ASISTS GUI
2.0 Patch 23. Retrieved April 2, 2018.
Emergency Nurses Association (ENA), Institute for Emergency Nursing Research
(2011). Emergency department violence surveillance study. Emergency Nurses
Association, Des Plaines, IL; 2011. Retrieved from:
http://www.ena.org/IENR/Documents/ENAEDVSReportNovember2011.pdf
Feds Data Center (2018). FedDataCenter.com, a service of FedSmith Inc. Retrieved
from: https://www.fedsdatacenter.com/federal-pay-rates/
Fink-Samnick, E. (2015). The new age of bullying and violence in health care: The
interprofessional impact. Professional Case Management:165-174, July/August
2015.
Gates, D. M, Fitzwater, E, Meyer, U. (1999). Violence against caregivers in nursing
homes: expected, tolerated, and accepted. Journal of Gerontological Nursing.
1999;25(4):12-22 Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.3928/0098-9134-19990401-05.
Hlebovy, D. (2000). Violence in the Workplace. Nephrology Nursing Journal, 27(6), 631,
December 2000.
Hodgson, M. J., Mohr, D. C., Drummond, D. J., Bell, M., & Male, L. V. (2012).
Managing disruptive patients in health care: Necessary solutions to a difficult
problem. Am. J. Ind. Med. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 55(11),
1009-1017. doi:10.1002/ajim.22104.
Gerberich, S., Church, T., McGovern, P., Hansen, H., Nachreiner, N., Geisser, M.,
Ryan,A., Mongin,S., Watt, G., Jurek, A. (2005). Risk factors for work-related
assaults on nurses. Epidemiology 16:704–709.
Jackson, D., J. Clare, and J. Mannix (2002). Who would want to be a nurse? Violence in
the workplace - a factor in recruitment and retention. J Nurs Manag Journal of
Nursing Management 10.1 (2002): 13-20. Web.
Kvas A, Seljak J. (2014). Unreported workplace violence in nursing. International
Nursing Review. 2014 Sep; 61(3):344-51. Epub 2014 May 22.
Lamberth, B. (2015b). Workplace Bullying in Healthcare: Part 2. Radiology
Management. 2015 Mar-Apr; 37(2):16-20; quiz 21-22.
Leckey, DK. BSN, RN, EMT-Paramedic (2011). Ten strategies to extinguish potentially
explosive behavior. Nursing: 55-59, August 2011.

38

Littlejohn, P. (2012). The missing link: Using emotional intelligence to reduce workplace
stress and workplace violence in our nursing and other health care professions.
Journal of Professional Nursing, 28(6), 360-368.
doi:10.1016/j.profnurs.2012.04.006
Nolan, P. P. (2000). Challenging violence. Nursing Times, 96(24), 32-33
Occupation Safety and Health Administration. (2013). Caring for our caregivers: Facts
about hospital worker safety. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor and
OSHA.
Occupation Safety and Health Administration. (2016). Guidelines for preventing
workplace violence for healthcare and social service workers. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Labor and OSHA. OSHA 3148-06R 2016.
Phillips, J. (April, 2016). Workplace violence against health care workers in the united
states. The New England Journal of Medicine: 374:17, 1661-1669.
Pearl, R. (2018). 3 ways to fix the va amid ongoing scandals. Forbes.com. Retrieved
from: https://www.forbes.com/#60f297892254.
Pompeii, L., Schoenfisch, A., Lipscomb, H., Dement, J., Smith, C., Conway, S. (2016).
Hospital workers bypass traditional occupational injury reporting systems when
reporting patient and visitor perpetrated (type II) violence. American Journal of
Industrial Medicine, July 2016. Retrieved from:
https://doi.org/10.1002/ajim.22629
Potera, C. (2016). Violence against nurses in the workplace. AJN, American Journal of
Nursing, 116(6), 20.
Gros, K. (2017). Process Map for Direct and Indirect Costs of Workplace Violence
(2017). [Graphic illustration July 26, 2018]. Reducing costs of va medical center
workplace violence performance improvement project. Retrieved from author,
Kirstin.gros@va.gov.
Rawson, J. V., Thompson, N., Sostre, G., & Deitte, L. (2013). The cost of disruptive and
unprofessional behaviors in health care. Academic Radiology, 20(9), 1074-1076.
doi:10.1016/j.acra.2013.05.009
Reade, C. BS, RN-BC, NE-BC; Nourse, R. RN, CCRC (July 2012). Intervening to
prevent violence in psychiatric units. Nursing:14-17, July 2012.
The Joint Commission. (2008). Behaviors that undermine a culture of safety. Sentinel
Event Alert, Issue 40.
The Joint Commission (2010). Preventing violence in the health care setting. Sentinel
Event Alert, Issue 45.
Veteran Health Administration, Central Office (VHACO) (2016). Vha disruptive
behavior report.

39

Weinberger, L.E., Sreenivasan, S., Smee, D.E., McGuire, J., and Garrick, T. (2018).
Balancing safety against obstruction to health care access: an examination of
behavior flags in the va health care system. Journal of Threat Assessment and
Management 2018, Vol 5, No1, 35-41.

40

APPENDICES
Estimation Model for VAMC Patient Disruptive Behavior

Sensitivity

41

Sensitivity

42

43

ASISTS DATA

